Abstract. In the last two decades, public administrators have increasingly faced groups of people with opposing views about the risks of exposure to environmental contaminants. Because of a series of intriguing studies on risk perception, the situation is frequently seen, by scholars and administrators alike, as a con£ict between experts and citizens, and risk communication guidelines are based on this interpretation. But the citizen-expert dichotomy appears fallacious when it is examined in light of the ways citizens actually participate in environmental policy making. The dichotomy overlooks the fact that citizens express their perception of risk largely through organized citizen groups, and that these groups employ and have access to many experts. This essay uses a mainstream environmental group and a number of grassroots environmental groups to illustrate the point. It concludes that the more important con£ict is between experts who ¢nd environmental pollution safe and those who ¢nd it hazardous.
Introduction
In the last two decades, public administrators have increasingly faced groups of people with opposing views about the dangers of exposure to environmental pollution. In the 1970s at Love Canal, at Three Mile Island, and at Woburnt o name prominent cases^some people argued that public health was seriously endangered and that immediate action should be taken to prevent further exposure; other people argued that the exposures in question were not hazardous and that no protective action was necessary (Levine, 1982; Walsh, 1991; Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990) . Today in the 1990s we hear the same kind of debate. For example, some people say that the nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada would pose a serious public health hazard; others insist it would be safe (Erickson, 1994) . Some people believe that synthetic chemicals have caused large numbers of diseases; others say they have not (Proctor, 1995) .
These situations are frequently seen, by administrators and scholars alike, as con£icts between experts and lay people^experts taking the position that exposures to environmental pollutants are safe, lay people insisting the exposures are dangerous (Wildavsky, 1995; Whelan, 1993) . The idea that these are controversies between experts and lay people has its ¢rmest empirical foundation in the work of a group of researchers led by Paul Slovic who, since the late 1970s, have been studying`risk perception.' In dozens of published papers Slovic and his colleagues have shown that experts and lay people make di¡erent estimates of mortality rates and employ di¡erent kinds of rationality in making those estimates. (For overviews see Slovic, 1987; Royal Society, 1992) .
In the initial demonstration that experts and lay people construe risk di¡er-ently, Slovic, Fischho¡, and Lichtenstein asked three groups of ordinary people to estimate death rates from various modern technologies. They then compared these estimates with the estimates by a group of`experts'^people with`professional involvement in risk assessment.' Finding that for nuclear power, pesticides, and some other technologies, lay people estimated death rates as far higher than they actually are, while experts made more accurate estimates, the researchers set out to understand lay people's reasoning. They hypothesized that lay people think of hazards not according to expected fatalities, but according to the characteristics of the hazard. So they administered a new questionnaire which listed possible characteristics. They found that the hazards ordinary folk think are very risky are`unknown' (unobservable, unfamiliar, with delayed e¡ects and so on) and`dread' (uncontrollable, not easily reduced, inequitably distributed, etc). In contrast, the hazards people think are not very risky are familiar and controllable (Slovic et al., 1979; 1980; 1981) .
The researchers concluded that lay people aren't ignorant of what is`really' risky. Rather, compared to experts, they employ a broader and richer kind of rationality. Instead of considering technological hazards from a reductionist, technical perspective, they take into consideration qualitative issues like fairness and equity. They are concerned with costs and bene¢ts. They think about community cohesion and about future generations and about their personal lives. In sum, they bring their beliefs and values into play (Slovic, 1987; Schwing and Albers, 1980; Covello, 1983; Perrow, 1984; Fischho¡, 1985; Environmental Protection Agency, 1987; Johnson and Covello, 1987; Krimsky and Golding, 1992) .
From a policy perspective, whether and why people perceive something as risky is important because people, as citizens, think their views should a¡ect administrative decisions and environmental laws. Citizens demand that local governments pay attention to their opinions about the citing of hazardous waste incinerators, the dangers of living near abandoned toxic waste dumps, and how nuclear waste should be regulated. And governments do listen to citizens' views on these issues. But if experts, to whom governments also listen, disagree with citizens about what is harmful, how much and in what ways should citizens' perceptions of risk in£uence decision makers?
The risk literature o¡ers two kinds of answers, both under the rubric of`risk communication.' To some scholars, while citizens' e¡orts to a¡ect government should be respected, administrators should try to bring the citizens' ideas about risk closer to the experts'. Thus, while agency personnel need to pay close attention to citizens, the attention is primarily in order to understand why they hold the ideas they do, to gain their trust, and to help agency representatives explain scienti¢c and technical information to them e¡ectively (Environmental Protection Agency, 1990: p. 24; Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, and Heath, 1987; Michaud, 1991) . As Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz put it after describing the public's profound skepticism about the nuclear waste repository in Nevada,`Countering such attitudes and opinions will require extraordinary honesty, patience, and skill in communicating the appropriate information to the public ' (1993: 
